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Reflexive Figures: The Encounter in Interactive Arts
By Jean Dubois
Interaction is about encounter rather than control.
- David Rokeby
Since the early 1970s, with the emergence of closed circuit video and installations, artists
have endeavoured to immerse spectators within the artistic representation itself. One
thinks of the works of Peter Campus (Interface, 1972), Dan Graham (Present, Continuous
Past(s), 1974), or Bill Viola (He Weeps for You, 1976), whose video installations cause a
temporal or spatial shift in spectators’ relationship with their own image. While this does
not yet involve interactivity between spectator and device, one can nonetheless speak of the
presence of a retroactive portrait generated through video feedback, as spectators are led
to examine their participation as subjects of the work. Artworks now require, not just the
body’s implicit participation in their reception, but the spectator’s explicit physical
involvement—or the work remains inoperative. The spectator’s individuality is thus staged
in the device-generated gap between his or her own image and their actual presence in the
physical space. It is often a question of exploring the phenomenology of the present
through the specular effects of closed circuit video.
Beginning in the 1990s, this mirroring characteristic of video feedback extends into the
interactive experimentations of digital installations. Among other things, what artists
propose is a critique of the spectator’s narcissistic gaze by way of devices using or
simulating the mirror. Christian Möller’s Electronic Mirror (1993) is equipped with a motion
detector and reacts to the viewer’s approach. As the spectator moves toward the mirror, a
liquid crystal display covering the reflective surface thickens and veils the specular image.
Spectators are thus deprived of their mirror image precisely when they move up for a closer
look. The critical nod to the Narcissus myth is clearly delineated in this instance. Less
ironical, but just as straightforward, is the Narcissus reference in Liquid Views (1993), by
Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauß. In this setup, spectators can contemplate their
own image in a cathode ray monitor that’s turned upward. Here, the closed circuit video
image can be touched and altered, like the ripples on the surface of a basin of water. And
the effect is more equivocal. One hesitates between a fascination with the image treatment,
which allows one to simulate instant surface fluidity, and an embarrassing feeling of being
placed in the position of a character subjugated by his own reflection.
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Other artistic approaches focused on intersubjectivity as an identificatory factor, in both
explicit and dynamic fashion. The basic principle of this approach implies a self-awareness
that relies on cognizance of others developed through directly expressed interactions,
particularly in the face-to-face context of conversation, reciprocal gestures, or any similar
“symbolic interaction.” The subject is thus closely connected with the interiorization of the
“generalized other.” (1) The human spirit can only develop through social life, which also
prompts us to consider introspective thought as a form of dialogue with oneself modelled
on interpersonal communications.
“Interaction encompasses not only the co-presence of participating actors, but also a
multitude of others who invisibly permeate their rapport with the world. No man is an
island. Our socially constructed character is under the manifold gaze of the innumerable
others who accompany us, physically and morally. Actress Simone Signoret, for instance,
could declare having accomplished all the actions in her life under the gaze of four or five
people, both alive and departed, who mattered to her and whose consciousness continued
to inhabit her. A kind of ghostly audience attends to every interaction.” (2)
By drawing the notion of symbolic interaction toward that of interactivity, one can shift a
certain logic of interpersonal relations toward person-machine relations—particularly when
that machine plays a participating role among the real, flesh-and-blood participants who
haunt our memories or imaginations. Doubtless, this is partly why Edmond Couchot turns
the “encounter” into an artistic genre in its own right, (3) whether the relationship is directed
toward a character, an object, or a virtual environment.
Gary Hill’s Tall Ships (1992) proposes a silent video encounter with a community of twelve
individuals who grow nearer and farther from us as we proceed through a corridor. As soon
as these luminous, ghostly figures detect our presence, they seem to approach and almost
to beckon us. Silence gives way to gradual familiarization as the rapport between spectator
and device-generated character becomes increasingly close, until the character images
reach human scale and allow for eye-to-eye contact. The scene suggests an Orphic journey,
a spectral quest in search of a lost being that one meets again, fleetingly and partially. When
viewers turn up in sufficient numbers, Tall Ships offers another form of encounter.
Participants’ paths constantly cross and, as the luminous characters approach and become
large enough to light the corridor, spectators’ own silhouettes begin to appear, the contours
of their faces subtly revealing themselves. Thus, another community of bodies emerges
from the darkness. Though quite real, and despite the participants’ very physical presence,
this community leaves spectators with a feeling no less peculiar and strange. In the guise of
blurring boundaries between this world and the next, Tall Ships opens a fleeting doorway
between the tangible universe and our imaginary world. As George Quasha and Charles
Stein recount, (4) each visitor experiences something different. Some feel as though they’re
being watched, or vaguely perceived. Some feel no anxiety in the encounter, knowing that
one doesn’t have to speak or move to establish contact. For others, it brings out a
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discomfort with the ambivalence and superficiality that the situation suggests.
Consequently, Quasha and Stein tie the work to a mirror effect, a space in which anything
can happen and where each viewer may apprehend a different reality while being aware
that one’s mind is simply a refection. In this experience, the notion of projection breaks
down and reforms according to mental and physical understandings of it. While the
interplay of optics and geometry in video projections enables the isomorphic reproduction
of evanescent luminous rays from the monitor surface to the walls, the same process can
also trigger a defensiveness in spectators who transpose to the characters ideas and
feelings not easily identified in themselves. The process also reflects the artist’s intent, since
in his view spectators complete the “circuit” of the work by consciously taking part in the
event. The character images in Tall Ships act as shifters for an introspective reading,
inasmuch as they are the descriptive signs of these characters. While the experience
explicitly suggests an encounter with the other, it also strongly favours an implicit encounter
with oneself.
More explicit still is Max Dean’s Be Me (2002), an installation he created together with
Kristan Horton, which enables spectators to unequivocally project themselves into the
artist’s interactive portrait. As the session begins, the artist’s voice prompts spectators to
appropriate the artist’s identity and to say something. As soon as the spectator accepts the
involvement, the artificial figure imitates his expressions and pronunciation. A camcorder
and microphone capture the spectator’s facial expressions and speech and transpose them
to the digital model to produce a real-time animation that approximates his or her
behaviour. If spectators’ gestures are too sudden or erratic, the response becomes
unstable, and the face distorted and strangely grimaced. Control of the virtual face, then,
correlates to the spectator’s control over his or her own behaviour. A mere gesture lies
between the congruous and the monstrous. Once again, the spectator seems to be at the
heart of the situation, the interactive portrait simply offering a pretext or an intermediary
favouring an intriguing encounter with oneself. Dean thus highlights concerns
accompanying the definition of personal, if not human identity. In the case of Be Me, the
mirror effect occurs through an extended sequence of procedures involving audiovisual
pick-up, artificial intelligence, form recognition, and digital modelization and animation. Yet
the self-relationship is rendered not merely by the array of dovetailed technologies, but
especially by the mask of an image borrowed from the artist’s foreign identity. Is the
spectator striving simply to be another, or to be the indispensable soul animating a
polymorphic machine? To what extent can one recognize oneself in the process? The artist’s
self-portrait is only a pretext. Spectators learn nothing of his identity or personality. Rather,
with a hint of dark humour, the digital visage embodies the awkwardness of automated
identification by the humanoid machine.
While critic Rosalind Krauss connected the aesthetics of video art with Narcissus, (5) artist
David Rokeby places interactive arts in the purview of the Echo myth. (6) Rather than set
spectators plainly before their own image, interactive arts give them back an echo of their
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actions. By causing a gradual discrepancy between form and sound, the echo, Rokeby says,
better represents the interactive relationship between person and machine. A certain
distortion would necessarily occur between human behavioural contributions and what the
machines return. Contrary to what happens with closed circuit video installations, the
spectator’s profile and movements are generally transposed to conditions very different to
his or her physical situation. As in the case of Graham’s and Campus’ video installations of
the 1970s, interactive works are first and foremost “distorting mirrors,” where spectators
test out contorted relationships with themselves. The interactive work is then potentially
defined by the outcome of an encounter with situations composed by the artist. (7)
In offering transformed reflections of our identity, interactive arts are following artistic
tradition while integrating original symbolic strategies that are of our time—not limited to
the newfangled technology du jour. The artistic desire to create an interpersonal
relationship rather than merely a personal description doesn’t just come from the
technology in use. It takes into account ideological and cultural perspectives that view
personal development and identity as constituted in relation to life in society and
relationships with others. Nonetheless, at a time when interpersonal relationships are
increasingly mediatized through ever more sophisticated digital devices, one may wonder
about their impact on human relations and on the process of defining personal identity.
While they may induce a fascination with technology, the previously examined devices raise
questions regarding the possibility of resolving the problems of defining a personal identity.
In our information-based civilization, they may even suggest a critical self-examination of
technological mediation by questioning the bases of the reasoning, aesthetics, and ethics of
our human engagements. Through the process of bringing about the interactive simulation
of an encounter, one may glimpse the issue of subjectivity confronted with itself. Besides
mere anthropomorphic representation, what seems to emerge is an exploration of human
nature. Art, human sciences, and technology jostle together here, in a quest to define our
rapport with others and with ourselves. The use of digital media serves to generate a
specular experience that can return us an image of our social condition and of our personal
actions. The creation of such interactive automata offers an occasion to develop a critical
poetry of human relationships and, perhaps, a new artistic genre adopting terms specific to
an artifice of encounter.
[Translated from the French by Ron Ross]
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